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Danling Fu 
There has been great interest in Vygotsky and in how his 
views affect the understanding of learning and teaching since 
the early 80's in the United States. Today, this interest con-
tinues to grow and Vygotsky's views continue to affect the 
improvement and reform of contemporary education in the 
United States. New interest in his theories has been sparked 
too in Russia after his work has been decreed as reactionary 
bourgeois pseudoscience for sixty years. Also after Vygotsky 
has been labeled as an anti-Marxist bourgeois psychologist 
for decades in his country, he is recognized as a devout Marx-
ist. Russian Vygotskian expert, Toulmin (1981) wrote: 
Vygotsky was happy to call himself a Marxist. The historical-
materialist approach ensured the success of his scientific 
investigations; this was the philosophy that armed him, gave 
him the basis for integrating the sciences of developmental 
psychology, clinical neurology, cultural anthropology, the 
psychology of art. That is what we, psychologists of the West, 
must now study seriously, (p. 79) 
However, he is rarely connected with Marxism in the 
United States, as Benjamin Lee stated, "American research-
ers have focused on his work on language and thought and 
neglected his Marxist and functionalist side" (1985, p. 66), 
even though his theory on individual consciousness develop-
ment and his social and cultural constructivist approach are 
well received by American educators. This neglect may 
reveal a deliberate disconnection of Vygotsky from Marxism 
among American scholars because most people in the United 
States associate Marxism either with Communism or the 
concept of class struggle, a concept rather threatening to many 
Americans. Also, on the surface, Vygotsky's work on the 
development of individual mind was hardly recognized 
indebted to Marxist theory as, according to Haldane (1969), 
"Marxism has extremely little positive to say about the 
individual mind. It is concerned mainly with the social 
relationships of the individual and the general materialistic 
point of view" (p. 157). As a result, in his own country, only 
until recently, Vygotsky had been seen as a target of Soviet 
Marxists. 
Vygotsky was a Marxist, though the content of his study 
is remote from the content of Marx' and Engels' studies. The 
former studied the internal structure of human mind; the 
latter focused on the external structure of the human society. 
Marxism, to Vygotsky, was not simply a weapon of ideology, 
as it was to many mechanic Marxists, but a theory, or a scien-
tific approach. He did not treat the Marxist methodology as a 
mathematical formula or recipe which guided him rigidly in 
his psychological analysis. Instead, he digested it, in his word, 
"internalized" it and transformed it into his own principle 
which dominated his way of thinking and directed his study 
of human psychological development. As he said "I don't 
want to discover the nature of mind by patching together a 
lot of quotations. I want to find out how science has to be 
built, to approach the study of the mind having learned the 
whole of Marx's method" (Mind in Society, p. 8). Vygotsky's 
thinking and approach are Marxist, as claimed by Wertsch, 
"in more subtle but no less fundamental ways," and his debt 
to Marx "runs deeper than is commonly recognized" (1985, 
p. 5). 
To cut off Vygotsky from Marx is to look at him frag-
mentally and to separate his work from its theoretical basis. 
The very act is anti-dialectical materialism, the fundamental 
principle guiding Vygotsky's research and shaping his 
analysis. A discussion of Vygotsky in the context of Marxism 
will help us reach an understanding of the theoretic frame-
work of Vygotsky's thinking. This understanding will lead us 
to a more profound interpretation of Vygotsky's theory and 
approach. Hopefully this discussion will also help readers 
understand Marxist theory and methodology in some way. In 
this article, based on two of Vygotsky's most known works 
among American educators: Thought and Language and Mind 
in Society (they are referred as Thought and Mind in the text), 
I will examine how Vygotsky applied Marxist principles to 
his study of human psychological development and present 
in what way he was a Marxist. In doing so, first of all, we 
have to review Marxist principles. 
Dialectical Materialism 
The most fundamental doctrine of Marxist philosophy is 
dialectical materialism, concerned with "the most general laws 
of change and development in nature, society and thought" 
(Jozef, 1981, p. 147). It is "materialism," because dialectical 
materialism postulates that matter or material reality is 
primary and its mental reflection is secondary or derivative. 
Marx wrote, in the Preface to the second edition of Capital 
(translated, 1967) that "the ideal is nothing else than the ma-
terial world reflected by the human mind and translated into 
forms of thought" (p. 253). 
Dialectical materialism sees things in relations, analyzes 
them and then reintegrates them into total movement. 
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Bukharin (translation, 1961) states in his discussion on 
dialectical materialism: 
The world being in constant motion, we must consider 
phenomena in their mutual relations, and not as isolated 
cases. All portions of the universe are actually related to 
each other and exert an influence on each other. The 
slightest motion, the slightest alteration in one place, 
simultaneously changes everything else. The change may 
be great or small—that is another matter—at any rate, 
there is a change, (p. 269) 
Dialectical materialism asserts that matter is in a process of 
constant moving and changing, so are its reflected mind, 
thought and consciousness. In the first place, the dialectic 
method of interpretation demands that all phenomena be 
considered in their indissoluble relations: in the second place, 
that they be considered in their state of motion. Dialectical 
materialism as applied to human history is called historical 
materialism, which is interested in development of the 
process of BECOMING but not in the object of BEING, and 
especially concerned with the original sources of the devel-
opment, as Marx declares in his Capital (translated, 1967) 
that "The object of our method of inquiry is to take posses-
sion of matter in its detail, to analyze its various forms of 
development and to discover its inner law" (p. 56). 
The materialist dialect is an analysis of the movement of 
this content, and a reconstruction of the total movement. It is 
a method of analysis for each degree and for each concrete 
totality - for each original historical situation. At the same 
time it is a synthetic method that sets itself the task of 
comprehending the total movement. It does not lead to 
axioms, constancies or permanencies, or to mere analogies, 
but to laws of development. 
Vygotsky's Marxist Methodology Of Research 
Vygotsky affirmed that "To study something historically 
means to study it in the process of change; that is the dialec-
tical method's basic demand"(A/md, p. 65). To understand 
Vygotsky's analysis, first of all, we have to understand how 
he approached his study. He constantly saw things in 
relationships and showed great interest in the essence of the 
relations and their complex dynamic natures. In his discus-
sions about the relationship between the scientific concept 
and the spontaneous concept in Thought and Language, we 
see one relation lead to another, and they all directly or 
indirectly relate to each other or influence each other ( p. 
197). For him, those relations are not static as they are not 
the products of the processes but are the processes themselves. 
It is through his method of psychological analysis that 
Vygotsky demonstrated himself to be a Marxist. In "The 
Problems and the Approach" in Thought and Language and 
"Problems of Method" in Mind in Society, Vygotsky clearly 
revealed himself as a dialectical materialist in his search for 
new methods of psycho-experimentation and analysis, which 
he believed was "one of the most important problems of the 
entire enterprise of understanding the uniquely human forms 
of psychological activity. In this case, the method is simulta-
neously prerequisite and product, the tool and the result of 
the study" {Mind, p. 65). In criticizing the current methods of 
stimulus-response, which, he believed, analyze stable and 
fixed objects, he advocated that psychological analysis of 
objects should be contrasted with the analysis of processes, 
which requires a dynamic display of the main points making 
up the processes' history. He believed that "Any psychologi-
cal process, whether the development of thought or 
voluntary behavior, is a process undergoing changes right 
before one's eyes" {Mind, p. 61). Therefore he declared that 
"we need to concentrate not on the product of development 
but on the very process by which higher forms are 
established" {Mind, p. 64) as he thought that the only way to 
study the highest stages in the development of attention is to 
understand it in all its idiosyncrasies and differences. In short, 
we need to understand its origin. 
In the end of the chapter "Problems of Method," Vygotsky 
summarized his discussion by identifying three kinds of analy-
ses which he believed are materialist dialectical approaches: 
process analysis, analysis that reveals real, causal or dynamic 
relations, and developmental analysis that returns to the source 
and reconstructs all the points in the development of a given 
structure. From these three approaches of analysis, we can 
see he focused his attention on changing and believed that 
the relationship between elements is the inner law which 
causes the changing, and was interested in the history of the 
development from its source to the possible future. Unlike 
many of his colleagues, he refused to establish Marxist 
psychology. In his discussion about the problems of 
methods, he declared that "the dialectical method is quite 
different in biology, history and psychology, and therefore, 
there are no Marxist magic formulas for solving the prob-
lems of psychology." He emphasized that "[I]mmediate 
application of the theory of dialectical materialism to the 
problems of science, and particularly to biology and psychol-
ogy, is impossible, as it is impossible to apply it instantly to 
history and sociology." He strongly opposed "the method of 
casually picking and choosing quotations from the classics 
of Marxism" {Thought, xxiii) and concluded that "the only 
legitimate way for Marxism to become useful for psychol-
ogy was its possible contribution to general methodology" 
{Thought, xxiii). For the rest of his life, as Kozulin comments 
on Vygotsky in his introduction to Thought and Language, 
"Vygotsky desperately sought this new methodology 
(general methodology) that would make psychology 
Education and Culture Spring, 1997 Vol. XIV No. 1 
12 DANLING FU 
scientific, . . . and that would make use of the Marxist method 
without degenerating into 'Marxist psychology'" (xxiii). The 
very attitude Vygotsky held in his searching for the method 
demonstrated him as a dialectical materialist, or a Marxist. 
Vygotsky's Dialectical Materialism in 
His Psychological Analysis 
Guided by the Marxist dialectical materialist theory, 
Vygotsky directed his attention to the process of human 
psychological development and drew his interest in finding 
out the inner law which caused the changing and evolution 
through analysis of the relation between biological or natural 
function and cultural function. In Thought and Language and 
Mind in Society he defined his psychological analysis 
"developmental" and "historical-cultural," as he looked at the 
changing processes and was especially interested in the inner 
law of the development. He focused on "the historically 
shaped and culturally transmitted psychology of human 
beings" {Mind, p. 122). He also called his psychoanalysis 
"instrumental," as he believed that psychology should not be 
an end but a means to "telescope[s] changes" {Mind, p. 123). 
Each chapter in Thought and Language and Mind in Society 
deals with some aspects of developmental change as Vygotsky 
conceived as the development, or transformation from 
natural or "lower" functions to cultural or "higher" functions. 
In Vygotsky's investigation of the transformation of lower 
functions to higher functions in human psychology, he 
considered each form in its growth and in it a necessary 
disappearance in its relations with others. His study draws its 
attention to the internal process of change. Take for example 
his analysis of relationship between egocentric speech and 
inner speech, one of the main discussions in his Thought and 
Language. Rejecting Piaget's assumption which considers that 
egocentric speech and social speech are two separate stages 
in human psychological development, Vygotsky showed with 
his experiments that egocentric speech is the transition from 
social speech (interpersonal) to inner speech (intrapersonal). 
Egocentric speech does not die out, or is not simply replaced 
by social speech, as Piaget assumed, but is transformed or 
developed into inner speech. The difference between Piaget's 
and Vygotsky's analyses is the former studied the elements 
in separation and focused on the products of the develop-
ment; while the latter looked at them in relations and drew 
attention to the process of changing. What separates Vygotsky 
from other psychologists is his dialectical materialist view. 
The three fundamental principles of dialectical materi-
alism, asserted by Marx in his Capital, are the unity of oppo-
sites, the passage of quantity to quality, and the negation of 
the negation. With this inner law of change, Marx and Engels 
analyzed the change of social structures or the development 
from the capitalist system to the socialist one. The process of 
transformation of capitalist society into socialist one, as Marx 
conceived, is, first of all, the self-destruction of capitalism 
which is caused by its internal conflicts of relations between 
production and means of production, between labor and 
productivity, and between use-value and exchange-value. In 
the transformation of capitalism to socialism, first of all it is 
the capital that is negating itself— "The monopoly of capital 
becomes a fetter upon the mode of production" (Marx, 
Capital, I, translated, 1967, p. 279). The self-negation is 
fol lowed by reconstruction and reorganization of the 
economic structure and relationship, which causes a new form 
of economic and social structure to appear—the coming of 
socialism. Socialism, Marx conceived, is a higher stage than 
capitalism in the social development. 
Vygotsky approached the analysis of the relation between 
the lower functions and higher functions with the principles 
of dialectical materialism pragmatically but not mechanically. 
He asserted that the transformation of lower functions to 
higher functions involves the destruction, reconstruction and 
transition of the former structure (elementary) to the struc-
ture of higher type. And "[hjigher psychological functions 
are not superimposed as second story over the elementary 
processes: they represent new psychological systems" {Mind, 
p. 124). The process of transformation, as he saw, involves 
the process of quantity to quality: first deconstruction, then 
reconstruction and transition to a new structure of higher type. 
These two levels are not simply two stages of development 
or one replaces the other but one transforms into another 
through internal conflicts, and structurally deconstruction and 
reorganization. 
When we parallel Vygotsky's approach to his analysis 
of the transformation of lower functions to higher functions 
with Marx's approach to his analysis of the transformation of 
capitalist system to socialist system, we find that both of them 
consider the change in relations between elements is the 
inner law of the transformation, and the transformation 
involves the process of deconstruction and reconstruction of 
the former structure, which brings out the formation of a quali-
tatively new form. Marx presented specifically how the 
relations change within each form, that is, how capitalism 
deconstructs itself and how the relations of the social and 
economic elements are reconstructed and reorganized into a 
new form—socialism. However, Vygotsky only presented a 
framework of the transformation of lower functions to higher 
functions: from social interaction to internalization. He did 
not show how the internalization actually happens, that is, 
how the relations of the elements in lower functions are 
deconstructed and reconstructed and reorganized into the new 
form of higher functions. Vygotsky was aware of the impor-
tance of the study of the internalization, but his short life 
span didn't give him a chance to fulfill his wish. The chapter 
on "Interaction between Learning and Development" in Mind 
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in Society reveals his awareness of the need of a study of this 
internal process: 
An aim of the psychological analysis of development is to 
describe the internal relations of the intellectual processes awak-
ened by school learning....If successful, it should reveal to the 
teacher how developmental processed stimulated by the course 
of school learning are carried through inside the head of each 
individual child. The revelation of this internal, subterranean 
developmental network of school subjects is a task of primary 
importance for psychological and educational analysis, (p. 91) 
I believe that if Vygotsky had lived longer, he would have 
undertaken this task. His analysis of how internalization 
happens would have been based on the three principles of 
dialect ical materialism because the processes of 
deconstruction and reconstruction must involve the 
operation of conflicts, negation and a transition of quantity 
to quality. 
The Dialectical Relationship Between Thought 
and Language 
With the dialectical approach, Vygotsky studied the 
relationship between thought and speech, and between a 
child's (actual) development and learning. In the chapter on 
"Thought and Word," in Thought and Language, Vygotsky 
opposed the approach which treated thought and speech as 
two isolated elements and analyzed them separately. He held 
that this method of analysis was not true analysis but only 
helpful in solving concrete problems. As a historical materi-
alist, Vygotsky saw thought and speech as a unit, "A word 
without meaning is an empty sound; meaning, therefore, is a 
criterion of 'word,' its indispensable as a phenomenon of 
speech. But from the point of view of psychology, the mean-
ing of every word is a generalization or a concept" (p. 212). 
To illustrate his idea of the unit of thought and speech, he 
used the term "word meanings," which, in his view, are 
dynamic rather than static formations. "They change as the 
child develops; they change also with the various ways in 
which thought functions" (p. 217). He was opposed to the 
assumption of his contemporary psychologists that the 
development of a word's meaning is finished as soon as it 
emerges and believed that they ignored the inner relationship 
between thought and language. To discover the inner 
relationship between thought and language, Vygotsky and his 
colleagues studied the relations between inner speech and 
external speech, between egocentric speech and inner speech, 
and between word meaning and word sense. The studies 
showed that, "The relation of thought to word is not a thing 
but a process, a continual movement back and forth from 
thought to word and from word to thought." Vygotsky 
claimed: "Thought is not merely expressed in words; it comes 
into existence through them" (p. 218). 
It is how Vygotsky approached his study instead of what 
he studied that demonstrated him as a dialectical or historical 
materialist. He focused his attention on the process of 
development and the interrelation of the elements in 
psychology. Cornforth (1963) in his discussion about 
dialectical materialism states that, "The aim of the 
dialectical method is to enable us logically and consistently 
to express the real interconnections and motion of things" (p. 
482). He went on to say in the next paragraph, "People with 
a metaphysical approach try to express changing things in 
fixed categories, and try to express the relations of things in 
categories suited only to considering things in separation" 
(p. 482). According to Cornforth's definition, Vygotsky's 
method is a dialectic one. 
Vygotsky's Dialectical View on the Relationship 
Between the Child's Development and Learning 
In his discussion on the relationship between the child's 
actual development and learning, Vygotsky began his 
discussions by criticizing the weaknesses of other methods 
of psychological analysis. He accused Piaget and James of 
failure to see the interaction between human development 
and learning. To Piaget, development was always a prerequi-
site for learning; which learning "forms a superstructure over 
development, leaving the latter essentially unaltered" {Mind, 
p. 80). To James, the learning process was reduced to habit 
formation and identified with development. And Koffka, as 
Vygotsky saw, tried to overcome the extremes of Piaget and 
James by simply combining the two. To Koffka, the two 
processes of development and learning were mutually 
dependent and interactive. 
Different from them, Vygotsky thought that "the nature 
of the interaction is left virtually unexplored in Koffka's work" 
{Mind, p. 81). The rejection and analysis of the three 
theoretic positions of Piaget, James and Koffka lead Vygotsky 
to a more adequate view of the relation between learning and 
development. Vygotsky believed that learning and develop-
ment are interrelated from the child's very first day of life. In 
the discussion of this interrelationship, he introduced his 
concept of the zone of proximal development. 
His notion of the zone of proximal development allows 
us to "take account of not only the cycles and maturation 
processes that have already been completed but also those 
processes that are currently in a state of formation" {Mind, p. 
87). This suggests that Vygotsky did not just keep his eyes on 
what the development had achieved, or the product of the 
development, but on the process of forming, or the dynamic 
developmental state. In contrast to other theories in which 
learning lags behind the process of development, he assumed 
that learning aims for a new stage of the development 
process. 
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In the analysis of the relation between the actual 
development and the zone of proximal development, he noted 
that the former "characterizes mental development retrospec-
tively," while the latter "characterizes mental development 
prospectively" (Mind, p. 87). The learning creates the zone 
of proximal development. The fundamental elements intro-
duced by school learning into the children's development not 
only awakens the internal relations of the intellectual pro-
cesses, but also changes the way of the child's natural learn-
ing. Usually a child learns concrete objects or actions before 
he learns abstract concepts in his real life experience. In 
Vygotsky's terms, children learn spontaneous concepts 
before scientific ones. But it is formal school learning that 
reverses this role in the child's thinking. He learns abstract 
concepts or scientific concepts in school learning, and his 
understanding of scientific concepts, in turn, helps him 
understand his spontaneous concepts better. This reverse in 
learning or in thinking plays a significant part in the revolu-
tionary transformations in the child's development. 
Vygotsky saw the relations between development and 
learning processes to be highly complex and dynamic. They 
are not mutually exclusive as Piaget assumed, nor mutually 
dependent as James proposed, neither interactive in the same 
pattern as Koffka saw. The strength of Vygotsky's approach 
is in seeing things in unity, in their inner relationship, and 
their changing process. It is his historical materialist approach 
that distinguishes him from other psychologists like Piaget, 
James and Koffka. 
Interrelationship of Language, School Learning 
and Human Development 
As a linguist, in addition to many other fields in which 
he engaged in, Vygotsky showed his special interest in 
language, or the relation between language and human 
development. In Thought and Language and Mind in 
Society, he describes language as a psychological tool that 
has a fundamental effect on the human development. Marx-
ism asserts that it is the use of tools that made humans differ-
ent from other species, that transformed human into what 
s/he is today, and that enabled him or her to master nature. In 
psychological development, Vygotsky affirmed that it is the 
use of language or the psychological tool that connects a 
human with his/her external world, that helps a human 
develop from the biological level to the conscious level and 
that enables him/her to master his/her own action. For Marx 
the use of tools made a revolutionary change in human 
development: the change of human physically, the change of 
human's relationship with nature, and change of human's 
living style. For Vygotsky, the use of language also brings a 
revolutionary change in human psychological development: 
the change of individual's relationship with others, the change 
of one's relationship with self and the change of one's way of 
thinking. "If one changes the tools of thinking available to a 
child, his/her mind will have a radically different structure" 
(Mind, p. 126). The use of tools and language brings humans 
to a higher level of intelligence and consciousness and leads 
to the change of themselves and the world. 
Vygotsky asserted that both the use of language and 
school learning contribute to the revolutionary change in 
human development. Another characteristic of the use of 
language and school learning is that they both happen at the 
social level or interpersonal level first, and then at internal, 
or intrapersonal level. As a materialist, Vygotsky saw human 
as a product of nature and culture. Referring to psychologi-
cal tools as instruments for the construction of higher 
functions, Vygotsky wrote, "In the instrumental act, humans 
master themselves from the outside—through psychological 
tools." As to the structural role of interpersonal relations, he 
claimed that intrapersonal processes are just transformed 
interpersonal relations: "Each function in the child's cultural 
development appears twice; first between people 
( interpsychological ) and then inside the child 
(intrapsychological) . . ." and "All the 'building blocks' of 
higher behavior seem absolutely materialistic, and 'lower' 
natural mental functions are structured and organized accord-
ing to specifically human social goals and means of conduct" 
('Thought, xxvi). 
In psychology, social interaction is external activity, 
which Vygotsky believed is not only conditionally connected 
with the external environment but also makes internal activ-
ity possible. They internalize and reconstruct the operation 
which initially represents an external activity. "Functional 
systems are rooted in the most basic adaptive responses of 
the organism, such as unconditioned and conditioned reflexes" 
{Mind, p. 124). 
Marxism asserts that when matter changes, it is the 
external factors that stimulate the action and the internal 
factors that reorganize and reconstruct the operation. It is like 
water changing into ice or steam. Cold or hot temperature is 
the external condition for change but the real change 
happens within water itself. When the temperature reaches 
freezing or boiling point, the structure of the chemicals of 
water reconstructs into a new form. It is a transformation of 
quantity to quality, which, dialectical materialism believes, 
is one of the fundamental laws in the motion of matter. 
About this, Lenin (1909) said that "it alone offers the 
key to understanding 'leap,' to the 'interruption of gradual 
succession,' to the 'transformation into the opposite,' to the 
destruction of the old and the appearance of the new" (p. 175). 
Vygotsky affirmed that internalization and reconstruction are 
the transformation of an external activity, knowledge or 
abilities into internal ones, which involves the passage of 
quantity to quality. He said that it was "not a simple sum of 
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elementary process as associationistic psychology saw, but a 
qualitatively new form that appears in the process of trans-
formation" (Mind, p. 65). His notion of the zone of proximal 
development has the same theory that human learning 
"presupposes a specific social nature and a process by which 
children grow into the intellectual life of those around them" 
(Mind, p. 88). And the real changes stimulated by the course 
of school learning are "carried through inside the head of 
each individual child" (Mind, p. 91). In summary, Vygotsky's 
debt to Marxism was profoundly demonstrated through his 
approach to his analysis of human psychological develop-
ment. He directed his attention to changing process, saw things 
in relationships and analyzed the human psychological 
development with the three fundamental principles of 
dialectical materialism: the unity of opposites, the passage of 
quantity to quality, and the negation of the negation. 
Pragmatism and Marxism 
When I discussed Vygotsky in the context of Marxism, I 
found a striking similarity between his Marxist approaches 
of psychological analysis and pragmatism. Was Vygotsky a 
Marxist or pragmatist? As do Marxists, he saw things in 
relationships but not in isolation and analyzed the process of 
becoming instead of the products of being. He focused his 
attention on the inner law of changing as he believed that 
matter and human consciousness were in a process of 
constant moving and changing. But pragmatists hold exact 
the same beliefs. They conceive evolution of a universe 
being not finished, but, in James' term, "in the making," or 
"in the process of becoming." In Roth's discussion of Dewey's 
pragmatic view, Roth (1962) says: 
Dewey viewed the world as ongoing and developing, he did 
not view things in isolation. The basic characteristic of things 
of nature is interaction. This is to say that things do not merely 
act; they react or interact and in this interaction the onward 
movement of nature is carried out. (p. 194) 
The similarity between Dewey and Vygotsky shown above is 
attributed to the similarity between pragmatism and 
Marxism in a certain way. Dewey was viewed as a Marxist 
by some American Marxists at the late 40's—"The most out-
standing figure in the world today in whom the best elements 
of Marx's thought are present is John Dewey . . . " (Novack, 
1975, p. 273), and Lenin was presented "as an unavowed 
disciple of Dewey in practice" (Novack, 1975, p. 296). 
Actually pragmatism and Marxism are fundamentally differ-
ent. Only by showing the differences between the two 
philosophies, can we tell whether Vygotsky was a pragmatist 
or Marxist. 
The Relationship Between Matter and Mind 
The fundamental distinction between Marxism and 
pragmatism is that they differ in their view of the relation-
ship between matter and mind. Marxists believe that the 
physical world is the prime reality, and mind is the reflected 
reality of the physical world. Matter can exist apart from mind 
but mind cannot exist without matter. Pragmatism holds that 
matter and mind have an interdependent relationship. Dewey 
(1958) said in his Experience and Nature that matter expresses 
"a character of natural events and changes as they change; 
their character of regular and stable order;" mind is "the 
order of their meanings in their logical connections and 
dependencies" (p. 58). To pragmatists, matter is viewed as 
not regular but highly irregular, not orderly but chaotic, 
depending on the level of approach to its manifestation 
(Novack, 1975). Marxism affirms that matter causes mind, 
as Engels (1888) said, "Matter is not a product of mind, but 
mind itself is merely the highest product of nature" (p. 198). 
Pragmatism, being against any causal connection between 
matter and mind, believes that matter "covers lesser, more 
external fields of interaction; the mind deals with wider, more 
complex, more inward characteristics of events" (Novack, 
1975, p. 288). 
Vygotsky's agreement with the Marxist view of the causal 
connection between matter and mind is clearly shown by his 
notion of the two stages of psycho-development (first at the 
social level, then at the internal level)—"All the higher func-
tions originate as actual relationships between human 
individuals" (Mind, p. 57), and his notion of the zone of proxi-
mal development (learning as a social activity)—"human 
learning presupposes a specific social nature and a process 
by which children grow into the intellectual life of those 
around them" (Mind, p. 88). Social activity is the external 
activity which causes or stimulates the internal action. 
Vygotsky believed that the psychology of human beings is 
historically shaped and culturally transmitted. Though both 
Marxism and pragmatism assert that human development is 
the process of interaction between external and internal 
operations, the former holds that an individual grows into the 
established culture, while the latter thinks that an individual 
fulfills himself through interaction with his environment. 
Vygotsky agreed with Marxism as he believed that "Children 
grow into the intellectual life of those around them" (Mind, 
p. 88). 
The Relationship Between Individual and the 
World 
One of the reasons that Vygotsky was labeled as 
anti-Marxist in his own country is his emphasis on the 
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internalization or individualization of external activities and 
knowledge, which is another distinction between Marxism 
and pragmatism. Marxism pays very little attention to indi-
viduals, as it views individuals as simply products of society, 
culture and nature unless they are taken as a collective force— 
class, then they function differently in relationship with their 
society and nature. On the contrary, pragmatism places great 
emphasis on individuals. The dominant theme of Dewey's 
philosophy is that human self-realization is achieved through 
interaction with nature. In his Individualism Old and New, 
Dewey (1930) said: 
Individuality is at first spontaneous and unshaped; it is a 
potentiality, a capacity of development. Even so, it is a unique 
manner of acting in and with a world of objects and persons . . 
. .Since individuality is a distinctive way of feeling the 
impacts of the world and of showing a preferential bias in 
response to these impacts, it develops into shape and form only 
through interaction with actual conditions; it is no more 
complete in itself than is a painter's tube of paint without 
relations to a canvas, (p. 89) 
Dewey viewed human development as the fulfillment of 
human personality or self-realization. And the individual's 
relation with the world is to find and fulfill oneself through 
the interaction with the world. In turn, the self-realization 
and self-fulfillment will help the world be fulfilled. Vygotsky's 
emphasis on the importance of internalization and individu-
alization in human psycho-development is different from 
Dewey's. Internalization and individualization, to Vygotsky, 
is the qualitative change stimulated by the external condition 
happening within a substance itself, which Marxism holds as 
one of the fundamental laws in the motion of matter. 
The Process of Changing 
Another difference between Marxism and pragmatism 
lies in their interpretations of the processes of change in man 
and nature. Though they both agree that the world is in the 
process of changing or becoming, Marxism affirms that the 
change is a transformation from one form to another, and the 
processes of transformation involve deconstruction, recon-
struction and reorganization of the old system or relations, 
which bring out the appearance of a new form. Pragmatism 
asserts that the processes of change are processes of fulfill-
ment and completion through compromising, adaptation, and 
adjustment. The change, to pragmatists, is not a transforma-
tion but an ongoing process toward fulfillment of individuals 
and the world. The process of moving and changing is a 
process of maintaining the moving equilibrium between an 
individual and his environment. 
The difference between Marxism and pragmatism in their 
interpretation of the process of change leads to another 
distinction between them, that is, their view of human 
development. Marxism holds that any development is hierar-
chical, in a systematic way from lower level to higher level. 
Human society develops from primitive to slave, to feudal, 
to capitalist, to socialist, and completes the development in 
communist society, which, Marx believes, is the highest form 
of human society. Pragmatists believe in multiplicity and 
pluralism. They think that society and nature are essentially 
indeterminate, so is Man. They are constantly in the process 
of moving toward their fulfillment, not in stages or in a 
systematic way, but in degrees or in the tendency toward 
integration. About Dewey, Roth (1962) said that, 
He was reluctant to single out any good as the summum bonum, 
the highest good, to which all others are subordinate. His only 
reservation was with regard to growth. Living, which means 
intellectual and moral growth, is the dominant vocation of all 
humans at all times, (p. 245) 
Obviously Vygotsky belonged to the Marxist camp in 
this aspect. This fact can be shown by the central theme in 
his work: the transformation of lower functions to higher func-
tions in human psychological development. As we discussed 
before, Vygotsky analyzed this transformation as a process 
of deconstruction, reconstruction and reorganization of one 
form, the lower form which results in the appearance of a 
new form, a higher form. The terms "lower level" and "higher 
level" used by Vygotsky suggest that he was a believer in a 
hierarchy in development. 
Vygotsky—an Unorthodox Marxist 
I believe that it is because of his unorthodox approach to 
Marxism that Vygotsky is so attractive to many American 
intellectuals and was rejected by Russian Marxists for many 
decades. In Psychology in Utopia, Kozulin (1984) comments 
on Vygotsky that, 
He took the writings of Marx absolutely seriously as a 
philosophy and also as a concrete epistemology for the 
political economy of the nineteenth century. At the same time 
he gave no sign of submission to Marxism as an ideology. He 
took the most sober and, at least under Soviet circumstances, 
most difficult position: he treated Marx as a theoretician, 
without prejudice, on a par with his treatment of Hegel, Freud, 
and Durkheim. (p. 67) 
Vygotsky was a real Marxist. As a person growing up in 
a "Marxist" country, I know many people in the Marxist 
countries tend to pile up the jargons of Marxism in their 
speeches and writings, which makes them sound Marxist, but 
they do not really know what Marxist principles are. 
Actually they treat Marxism as a form, like rhetorical clothes, 
and make their content match the form as if making their 
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bodies match their clothes. Refusing to adopt Marxist theory 
mechanically in his study, Vygotsky internalized Marxist 
theory and approach to study human mind and read the world. 
He was so natural as a Marxist, that even many people from 
the countries in which Marxism is dominant cannot recog-
nize him as Marxist. Perhaps also for this very reason that 
many American intellectuals can accept him. He was a Marxist 
scientist instead of a follower or a propagandist of Marxism. 
And this same reason he was rejected by Russian Marxists 
for many decades. Kozulin (1984) says that "The ban 
imposed on its publication and the general reluctance to 
reprint Vygotsky's works are due to the narrow-mindedness 
of Soviet ideological bureaucrats, who have been frightened 
by his unorthodox approach to Marxism" (p. 78). Bruner 
(1986) thinks that "He was never hamstrung by the theoreti-
cal system in which he located himself—and he probably 
suffered in consequence" (p. 156). I assume that besides the 
reasons Kozulin and Bruner mentioned, it is his profession— 
the study of the mind that doomed him as a Marxist. It is the 
field which Marx had so little to do with, and which, the 
radical Marxists believe, belongs to the middle class or 
bourgeoisie, not the working class or proletarians. Genius will 
always be discovered by the world, and now Vygotsky, a 
"Sleeping Giant," is re-recognized by his own people and the 
people of the world. 
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